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The Johannine Christianity of Albert Camus  
 
 
 
 
Although Camus never accepted the designation existentialist, for better or worse, his 
philosophical fate seemed destined to be ever discussed in relationship to Sartre. One of the 
stranger aspects of their overlapping destinies was the about turn that each had in relationship to 
religion. Sartre’s case is the more well known. It  involved Sartre’s belated fascination with, and 
approval of Jewish messianism. In the wake of Levinas’s and Derrida’s popularity such a 
fascination would seem barely worthy of comment today, but when Benny Lévy published these 
revelations in Hope Now: The 1980 Interviews (Sartre and Lévy, 2007:106–107) so incensed was 
Simone De Beauvoir that she thought this merely confirmed the onset of Sartre’s senility (and 
Lévy’s unscrupulousness); in fact, as Bernard Henri-Lévy has indicated in his biography of 
Sartre, it simply meant that Sartre had been receiving second hand instruction from Levinas (via 
Lévy¸ who would visit Levinas in the mornings before wandering over to see Sartre later in the 
day) (Henri-Lévy 2003: 301-306).  
The story surrounding Camus is much more bizarre, and more difficult to authenticate. 
The story, while aired in a few North American Christian newspapers, generally slipped by 
without notice -  none of the scholarly works written on Camus since its publication mention it. 
Perhaps that it is because it seems so improbable and the work so unscholarly.  
The story? In 2000 a Methodist minister from Ohio by the name of Howard Mumma, 
then ninety years old, wrote a book entitled Albert Camus and the Minister. According to 
Mumma, Camus had been visiting the American Church in Paris to listen to the organist, Marcel 
Dupré, and during his attendance of the services he had become deeply interested in Mumma’s 
sermons. After a few weeks he approached Mumma and a friendship between the two men 
developed. According to Mumma, Camus had never really read the Bible before their meeting - 
Camus apparently had a Latin Bible, which he would on occasion consult to check a point, but 
he had not actually read it in its entirety. The Protestant Mumma then bought Camus a French 
translation as a gift which he did read. As Mumma tells it, until that time, Camus had never 
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thought of the Bible as a composition in which allegory, symbol, metaphor and historical fact all 
weave seamlessly into conveying insights into the relationship between God and man which 
cannot simply be cashed out as empirical items. Mumma, in other words, showed Camus how to 
read the Bible like pretty well any educated theologian today would do. Of course, there are 
many millions of Christians and their critics who take the Bible literally and insist that this is 
how the book must be read (thus the American fundamentalist creationist and people like 
Dawkins, Hitchens are literally on the same page) and hence, today, these groups share little, if 
any, common orientation; whereas in Christendom, the pervasiveness of the common language 
meant that these types could form a kind of unity, but it is far from obvious that all interpreted 
their faith in the same literal manner. 
 Finally, after developing a serious interest in the Biblical orientation, at their last 
meeting, and shortly before his accident, Camus asked Mumma to baptize him (which, he 
regrets, he didn’t do), making it clear he did not want to join a Church, but he did want to 
commit himself to God in a personal way. 
We do not know if the story is true, but it may serve to highlight the fact that Camus’s 
relationship to religion and Christianity is complex, and that complexity is born out by a number 
of Camus’ own comments as well as his reception. Thomas Hanna, for example, quite rightly 
says, ‘it is a curious thing about the thought of Albert Camus that he has not estranged himself 
from Christian readers’(Hanna 1962: 56), while David Walsh, in a reading of Camus that 
converges in important ways with this paper, has observed that ‘To the multitude of lost and 
disorientated individuals for whom faith in all the gods, ancient or modern, is dead, Camus 
showed the way toward the recovery of transcendent spiritual truth’ (Walsh 1990: 53). Certainly 
Camus has had been well received by Christian authors such as Jean Onimus (Onimus 1970) and 
Thomas Merton (Merton 1985) who have seen important areas of overlap between what Camus 
is doing and their own faith. Christian readers have also accepted that Camus has raised authentic 
criticisms of the wrongs Christians have often done (Merton 1985; Peyre 1958: 382). On the 
other hand, there are those like  Avi Sagi who hold that ‘Camus’ repudiation of Christianity is 
radical and profound.’ Camus, he continues, ‘rejects it categorically and unreservedly, as a 
position that justifies suffering and evil, is impervious to the death of the innocent, and turns pain 
into a gesture of faith’  (Sagi 2003: 153-154). As below shows, I do not agree with this line of 
argument. But it is true that Camus did indeed despise the pious fanatic whose own insecurities 
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and fears are the real forces driving their religiosity as in The Plague’s Panneloux or the mad 
chaplain/ inquisitor in The Stranger. Furthermore, Camus did have to endure the self-righteous 
fanaticism of certain Christians —exhibited, for example, in one infamous public remark 
directed at Camus, ‘I have found grace and, you M. Camus, I am telling you in all modesty, have 
not.’ The attack reproduces the same kind of absolute certainty and hostility that Camus had to 
endure from communists, who were just as sure that the immanent God of history had delivered 
them their own personal salvation – and there are occasions, as in the following note, where 
Camus would put communists and Christians in the same camp, and criticize both for their smug 
sense of eschatological certainty, whilst positing a more cautious and humble optimism:  
 
Christians and communists will tell me that their optimism is based on a longer 
range, that is superior to all the rest, and that God or history, according to the 
individual, is the satisfying end-product of their dialectic. I can indulge in the 
same reasoning. If Christianity is pessimistic as to man, it is optimistic as to 
human destiny. Well, I can say that, pessimistic as to human destiny, I am 
optimistic as to man. And not in the name of a humanism that always seemed to 
me to fall short, but in the name of an ignorance that tries to negate. (Camus 1998: 
73).  
 
Christianity has always taught that pride of the self and self-righteousness are sins, even 
if Christians have never been immune from them. Behind these ‘sins’ is the substitution of one’s 
own moral superiority and one’s right to judge (an all-too-human trait) for the commandment to 
love and not to judge the neighbor. Christianity is often taken for a moral teaching, but, even if 
this is widely thought to be the case amongst Christians, such a viewpoint overlooks something 
much more distinctly and significantly Christian, viz. the distance between God and men and 
women; only one man has been born who was not morally deficient, only one should be 
divinized, and that is because He is at one with His Father’s will, which is why Christians 
believe he and he alone is the savior of the world.  In spite of Nietzsche’s mistaken and 
unfortunate conflation of Platonism and Christianity, Christianity is concerned with salvation not 
morality – the former involves a historically contingent act of divine sacrifice precisely because 
redemption is not possible solely through moral improvement. Camus’ claim that ‘I have 
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abandoned the moral point of view. Morals lead to abstraction and to injustice’ (Camus 2008: 
246) shares a deep affinity with the traditional Christian rejection of the idea of salvation through 
morality, and for much the same reason – that the concrete requirements of love cannot be 
compressed into a moral formulation; we might recall Camus’ lament at the end of The Rebel, 
that work which is the elaborate defense of the note I have just cited – that ‘the secret of the  
European is that it no longer loves life’ (Camus: 1975, 269; cf. Walsh, 77). It was this very 
combination of lovelessness and moralizing that he noted against François Mauriac, ‘Admirable 
proof of the power of his religion: he arrives at charity without passing by generosity. He is 
mistaken to continuously send me back to Christ’s anguish. It seems to me that I have a higher 
reverence than he does, never having believed myself to be permitted to expose the torment of 
my savior, twice a week, upon the first page of a newspaper for bankers’ ( Camus 2008: 16) 
Mauriac is not a figure whose work should be dismissed with a brush of the hand, but in their 
dispute, Camus would later concede that on the specific issue about which they had disagreed, 
Mauriac had been in the right. But Camus was not wrong to call Mauriac on the manner of his 
invocation of Christ’s name.  
If, then, Camus often criticized Christians, what was central in his criticism, I think it fair 
to say, was the persecutory tone and gesture that blurs the boundary between Christian, fascist 
and communist fanatic. Thus, too, he could write with a combination of solidarity, disgust and 
insight that: 
 
What the world expects of Christians is that Christians should speak out loud and 
clear, and that they should voice their condemnation in such a way that never a 
doubt, never the slightest doubt, could rise in the heart of the simplest man, that 
they should get away from abstractions and confront the blood stained face history 
has taken on today. The grouping we need is a grouping of men resolved to speak 
out clearly and to pay up personally. When a Spanish bishop blesses political 
executions, he ceases to be a bishop or a Christian or even a man; he is a dog just 
like one who, backed by an ideology, orders that  execution without doing the dirty 
work himself. We are still waiting, and I am waiting, for a grouping of all those 
who refuse to be dogs and are resolved to pay the price that must be paid so that 
man can be something more than a dog (Camus 1961: 71-72). 
5 
 
  
 
The one constant enemy throughout Camus’ life is the murderous substitution of 
abstraction for genuinely  human relationships and solidarity, and it is his attack upon this 
process that stands at the centre of the work that he himself called his most anti-Christian book, 
The Plague.   That statement so often repeated is, at the very least, disingenuous, and might be 
more accurately gauged if it is placed along a continuum with The Fall—written from within the 
fog and smoke of an inner circle of hell and saturated as it is in Christian imagery and a cry to an 
unknown God if ever there were one, which is why Marcel Arland could legitimately ask ‘if in 
driving man to despair “this devil’s advocate does not serve God’s cause?’ (Onimus 1970: 101). 
But is the leap between The Plague and The Fall any more startling than the movement from 
Sisyphus to The Rebel, a movement that seems a very clever contrivance—one is a question, the 
other an answer—but hardly one that represents an about-face? The Plague is, contra Camus’ 
own public assessment, if not a completely Christian work, at least a work that has deep affinities 
with Christianity, that takes the sad example of a lost soul who is a priest wanting to tell others of 
the nature of God, but whose love for and understanding of God is blocked by the absolutist 
preoccupation with the future which involves forgetting the here and now, and in that very act of 
forgetting leaves his faith tottering like a top after its spin has finished. Paneloux is friendless 
and believes he must be so in order to love God; Jesus surrounded himself with friends—for this 
is what his disciples were. And one should not underestimate the importance of ‘conviviality,’ a 
concept which takes its direction from the spirit that existed between Jesus and his disciples and 
that was extremely important in the  Middle Ages and which Ivan Illich has more recently 
attempted to revive (Illich 2005). I think it is this same concept that is so important to the 
relationship that exists between Rieux and Tarrou, and which is totally lacking in Paneloux.  
I doubt if Camus really thought Paneloux the embodiment of the Christian position. 
Indeed Paneloux is something of a red herring on the question of how The Plague can be related 
to Christianity. The real issue, and what is so conspicuously Christian in the work, is the central 
theme of engulfing evil, and the importance of love and solidarity as  response to it.  
Of the three most significant characters of the novel Paneloux, Rieux and Tarrou, it is the 
priest who is the most tragic. His tragedy consists in his being consumed by his role, and his 
desperation manifests itself in the zealotry of his faith. But that zealotry is the symptom of his 
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lack of faith. All Christians are driven by lack, but when that lack conceals itself as the false 
plenitude of certainty, the opening to the mystery of God’s will which is faith itself is locked 
tight. Panneloux is not a bad man, just one more sad creature who is caught between role and 
life, and who plays out his role in response to abstract and metaphysical issues. His life is 
graceless, and his faith is as grim as the world and the God whom he believes has total control 
over this world. The hiatus that ever exists between God, man and world which is so important to 
the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, and which we take up again below, does not exist in 
Paneloux. And while it may well never have occurred to Camus, the fact is that the rational 
enclosure of what Rosenzweig calls the All which makes of the world but the ever controlled 
being under the sovereignty of a higher transcendent being is Greek (and Islamic) rather than 
Christian (and Jewish.) The idea of a God who has total control over His creation may be a 
position held by some Christians, but it ignores a more fundamental and again the more 
distinctively revelatory Christian and Jewish tradition in which the loving responsiveness of God 
and humanity to each other is the real meaning of revelation – God, it might be recalled, cannot 
force his creatures to love Him. In sum that hiatus between creature and creator, in which the 
creature has its own integrity (which is its free will), is essential to the Jewish and Christian view 
of life. Panneloux, though, is  a creature who completely lacks awareness of his freedom because 
he has immersed himself into a phantasm of his own fears and speculations. He is the phantasmic 
Christian, the Christian whose faith and sustenance are purely abstract, and hence empty, and, 
most importantly, devoid, of the very loving relationship which gives faith its sole axis (see also 
Merton 1985: 211-213).  
Tarrou and Rieux may not be believers, but their action is the confirmation of a faith that 
is far more faithful than Paneloux. The solidarity and love between Tarrou and Rieux and the sad 
isolation of Paneloux illustrate a point written down later in Camus’ notebook: ‘St. John; “The 
one who says that he loves God and does not love his brother is a liar; because how can he say 
that he loves God, whom he does not see, if he does not love his brother, whom he does see?” 
Compare with confused Mind which says: ‘“If I do not love God, me (sic.),it is because I do not 
love men, and in truth why love them. (Camus 2008: 77)”’ 
 Paneloux struggles with an abstraction, with words that leave him isolated and unloved, 
and, worst, of all unlovable. To Paneloux’s rationalizations which are a vague attempt to defend 
what he takes as God’s ways, Rieux responds ‘No, father I have a very different idea of love. 
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And until my dying day I shall refuse to love a scheme of things in which children are put to 
torture’ (Camus 1970: 178). But Camus knows that this is not the Christian position, as is evident 
in his public denial that Christianity is a religion of resignation, where he responded to a 
question: ‘can one put down this word for a St. Augustine or a Pascal? Honesty requires that we 
judge a doctrine by its summits, not by its sub-products. And in the final analysis, little though I 
know about these matters, I have the impression that faith is not so much a peace as a tragic 
hope’ (Hanna 1962: 52).  
That anyone could think that this was somehow a critique of the Christian position not 
only displays how ignorant they are, but also how confused Christians like Paneloux themselves 
can be when they are prisoners of their own abstractions. But anyone who thinks carefully about 
Christianity should know that Christians believe God responds to prayers, not to speeches about 
God made on His behalf—as if He needs them. But that a Christian should love a scheme of 
things which put children to torture, as Paneloux is represented as having to believe? Surely this 
is faith is in salvation from the fall, and a world that tortures children is a fallen world. Rieux’s 
exclamation that ‘salvation is too big a word for me’ (Camus 1970: 178) is a nice rhetorical jab 
at Paneloux. However,  salvation is precisely what Camus wants, salvation from all that requires 
acts of rebellion in order to put the world aright. What Camus doesn’t believe is that we can have 
knowledge of  an apocalyptic moment in which this is achieved. Which is to say, in spite of 
himself and what he often seems to be saying about history, what he needs is time to work out 
and to provide coherence for the rebellious acts so that the triumphs over injustice be integrated 
into the constitutive fabric (our language, sentiments and institutions etc.) and forms of 
mediation of humanity. Contrary to what one might think from his critique of Hegelian and 
Marxian readings of redemptive history, Camus really does want and need history to be 
meaningful, but not in the way that murder and torture still exist and are rationalized as the 
required step. His position is much closer to Benjamin, and indeed, to Judaism generally in so far 
as his position is one of awaiting and anticipation in the lack of certainty, but in the scope and 
depth of his hope – the hope is realized when history comes together, but we cannot know when 
that is until it is manifest in the presence of the kingdom itself. The danger is as Franz 
Rosenzweig  said of those who await the coming of the kingdom  is that they try to storm, to 
usurp the kingdom, which recedes in that very act. Thus the revealed commandment of love is 
violated – for the ‘stormers’ of the kingdom. As Franz Rosenzweig continues their blind love of 
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the future leads them to skip the neighbor – for the neighbor now is an obstacle that must be 
removed so they can get to the type they want to be the neighbor –whether it be the victorious 
proletariat or superman is all one.  
This also stands in the closest relationship to the allegory at the centre of The Plague, an 
allegory which is also the renunciation of the idea of original innocence which Camus had 
previously espoused. I think it not exaggerating to say that The Plague is an allegory of original 
sin, at least if ‘sin’ is understood as ‘existential’ evil (and what else does it ever mean?), and 
Tarrou makes this explicit when he realizes that he has always carried the plague, and that all 
carry it, that all have it, that we must keep endless watch on ourselves. When he says he tries to 
be ‘an innocent murderer’ (Camus 1970:206-208) he has conceded that we don’t know the 
consequences of our actions, of our inevitable inattentions. We are all always weaving ourselves 
and our lives just as we are woven into a vast web of actions, where complicity is unavoidable, 
even if we are vigilant. To repeat, this is a very orthodox and well-put account of original sin. It 
is not a paean to Nietzschean innocence. As if to signal his own change, Tarrou announces 
‘When I was young I lived with the idea of my innocence; that is to say, with no idea at all.’ 
(Camus 1970: 201)  
The theme of the ubiquity of evil and love’s absence is also central to The Stranger, and 
its theological implications neatly converge with The Plague. Here, though, the focus is less 
upon the self’s reification but upon a more general social reification and the cold machinery of 
the state that is marshaled to execute Mersault, and that void is as much evident in the chaplain, 
who desperately consoles himself with the semblances and gestures of salvation—in vain trying 
with all his might to elicit a pathetic gesture from a condemned man—because the world in 
which he operates offers no real signs of it. Camus’ statement that Mersault is the kind of Christ 
our society deserves is a telling remark about the loveless world which condemns a man whose 
own lovelessness is infinitely more honest than the loveless world in which he must function. 
The world that condemns Mersault is itself but the alienation, isolation and emptiness writ large 
that constitutes Mersault. Except Mersault does not know how to lie. The society criticized by 
Camus, on the other hand, does not know how to be truthful. It requires office-bearers to protect 
the lie at its centre, and whereas Mersault becomes a murderer due to circumstances as 
contingent as preparedness to help a friend, the flicker of sunlight and the sweat of the moment, 
the social machinery of Mersault’s world reacts with rectitude and certitude to Mersault’s 
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refusal, or rather his complete inability, ‘to play the game.’ Mersault is really an opportunity for 
the monster which society domesticates to have its bloody feast in good conscience, to be a 
hissing spectator at a murder which has been elaborately and artfully contrived, and 
sanctified.(The Stranger is a most Girardian work.)   
 Of course, the bourgeois machinery of state murder dissected in The Stranger would 
seem to be the antithesis of the revolutionary justice required by communist messianists. But the 
divine commandment of neighbourly love is equally violated by bourgeois lovelessness and 
pseudo-messianic love of the next but one. Both fail to love the neighbour. In the case of that 
which sacrifices the present for the future, faith in the last battle—‘once these people are 
slaughtered God’s reign will be ushered in’—is to take into humanity’s hands the grace that is 
God’s. It is nothing but useless murder conducted under the auspices of a phantasm. This was, 
again, a central theme of The Rebel. And again the message was completely congruent with 
mainstream Christianity and Judaism. Also orthodox is to commit to resisting all that impedes 
the unity that God commands. Camus’ position is a riff on permanent revolution. But it is ever 
concrete and ever directed to those impediments to unity in which the human can be fully 
human, or if we were to put this in theological language, in which a human being could again be 
a creature dwelling in a divine image, rather than a fallen one, severed from the gifts of the 
creator due to an impenetrable wall of its own restlessly tormented self.   
 
*** 
Thus far I have suggested that Camus’ attack upon Christianity in The Plague and the 
The Stranger  are attacks upon phantasmic Christianity, which far from breaking with some core 
Christian concepts actually reproduce them. To be sure, Camus certainly saw Christians as 
particularly susceptible to the phantasmic, due, as The Rebel makes clear, to its susceptibility to 
inverse the apotheosis of God and humanity – this danger had also been identified by 
Rosenzweig as one of the intrinsic dangers of Christianity (Rosenzweig 2006: 424-425) . 
Certainly, though, Camus was also profoundly aware that the tendency to murderous apotheosis 
is deep within the human heart, and that deploying one amalgam of signs and symbols rather 
than another is not sufficient to save anyone. Thus too, when pressed, he eschewed the symbol of 
the atheist (Camus 2008: 110; Todd  1998: 359).   Martin Buber, who wrote to Camus praising 
him for the importance of his stance and the value of his work, also once rebuked his student and 
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biographer, Maurice Friedman, who, thinking that he was saying nothing contentious, relates 
how he once called Camus an atheist. Buber chided him with the comment: ‘Don’t call him an 
atheist. He is one of those people I speak of in religion and philosophy who destroy the images 
that no longer do justice to God.’ And as Friedman continues, for his part Camus would say, with 
respect to Buber, ‘I do not mind being called religious in Buber’s sense of an I-Thou relationship 
(Friedman 1996: 11).’  
 Nevertheless, apart from Mumma’s unverifiable claim that Camus wanted to embrace the 
Christian faith, Camus generally made it clear that he could not become a member of that faith 
(Camus 1961: 69). And in a very late note he says: ‘The world moves toward paganism but it 
still rejects pagan values. They must be restored, to paganize belief, Graecize Christ and restore 
balance’ (Camus 1961: 269.) That note certainly expresses the point of view most consistent 
with his public statements about religion. But the claim is somewhat problematic as an accurate 
representation of what we might call the subterranean theological residues at work in Camus’ 
own corpus. Also problematic is Camus’ appeal to the pagan world, which is more difficult than 
Camus acknowledges to reconcile with his other recurrent and more urgent appeals and motifs, 
based as they are on a deep commitment to social solidarity fundamentally at odds with the 
general pagan acceptance of tribal warfare and slavery – of course slavery and tribal warfare 
have plagued the Christian world, but their very existence is intrinsic to the world that the 
earliest Christians sought to renounce in their pursuit of a world to come which would be free of 
such obvious symptoms of what Augustine called the earthly city.  
A clearer nature of Camus’ faith can I think be gained by closer consideration of what 
Franz Rosenzweig had called a Johannine Christian position. That position involves faith in a 
non-denominational, wall-less Church, whose first modern father Rosenzweig says is Goethe 
(Rosenzweig 2006: 293 ff) —and we recall that it is precisely Goethe whom Camus singles out 
in ‘The Absurd man’ for having provided ‘the absurd speech’  in his statement ‘My field is time’ 
(Camus 1975: 64). The Johannine Church operates under the sign of ‘hope.’ And, as Rosenzweig 
points out, the modern prayer is one in which the individual’s own sense of mission is conjoined 
with God’s will. In other words, the Johannine Church is one which fuses the kind of decision 
about one’s life that Camus lays out in The Myth of Sisyphus with the commandment to love the 
source of the creation and one’s neighbor. In the Johannine Age even the name “God” loses its 
potency, and needs to be translated into non-denominational, even secular terms, much along the 
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lines that Feuerbach did – and this is more conspicuous in Feuerbach’s later work with its 
emphasis upon community as dialogue through love than the mere reversal of subject and object, 
God and man at the basis of The Essence of Christianity.  
The Johannine Christian can be said to believe that it is ‘good’ that the world is created 
(as is taught in Genesis), that love is the secret meaning of life or creation, and life is fulfilled 
when its multifarious energies are reconstituted and coordinated by love (which is to say that the 
purpose of life is to redeem what deserves to live across the times – and love is the power which 
is, as Rosenzweig citing Song of Songs formulates it, “as strong as death”). The Johannine does 
not renounce the pagan as such – indeed Rosenzweig emphasizes that the pagan is the natural 
condition of humanity. Thus revelation is not simply about denying all that is pagan but 
reconstituting it so that it is worthy of eternal life. The Christian contribution to this Jewish view 
of life is the historical redemptive journey, i.e. the ‘resurrection’ of dead forms of life and 
institutions and their reconstitution on a plane governed by love of the neighbor, hope in a better 
future and faith that our loving acts fulfill their potential within creation. In this light the 
Christian teaching of God as trinity (which, not surprisingly, was not of particular concern to the 
Jewish Rosenzweig, but follows from applying his insights to Christian symbolism) is that the 
source of creation  (the Father) (unlike the created creature) acts out of excess, the path of 
salvation or redemption requires overcoming suffering and death through unconditional love  and 
that means all except one(the Son) are responsible for contributing to the death and suffering of 
the world, and this love is ever moving and changing its form (the Holy Spirit).  
Rosenstock-Huessy, who also uses the same triadic division as Rosenzweig – and the 
division can be found in Schelling (Schelling 1977:314-325)-  of the Church being a sequence of 
Petrine, Pauline and Johannine reminds his readers in his forgotten masterpiece Out of 
Revolution, that the wall-less Johannine Church had as its early forerunner Joachim of Fiore, 
who had signaled ‘a post-ecclesiastical, i.e., political, spiritual and cultural history for our 
millennium’ (Rosenstock-Huessy 1993: 691). Further as Bernard McGinn has pointed out in his 
excellent study of Joachim, ‘For the abbot of Fiore the list of history’s villains is nothing else 
than the sum total of literalist exegesis’ (McGinn 1985: 126). What he says about Joachim is 
itself true of the Johannine Church in general, i.e., that it does not read scripture literally, at least 
to the extent that its members are conscious of their Christian heritage infiltrating the symbols 
and directives behind the solidarity to build a better future in which they place their hope. 
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Merton has called Camus a post-Christian (Merton 1985: 118, 211, 218, 229, 232, 252), and in a 
sense the ‘post-Christian’ is the typical constituent of what Rosenzweig calls Johannine 
Christianity. But the important affinity between Camus’ ostensible paganism and the redemptive 
mission of Christianity becomes obvious when we bear in mind how much paganism was 
revived/ redeemed by Christianity. In other words, when Camus wants the loveless Europeans 
who are caught up in their abstractions to learn from the Greeks he was not doing anything that 
different from the Christian humanists who devoted themselves to recovering and teaching long 
forgotten works from antiquity. However, there is frequently a tension in Camus himself 
between his appeal to idealized paganism and the more fundamental appeal of human solidarity. 
Moreover, his idealization of paganism tends to go hand in hand with his prolonged ‘wrestle’ 
with Augustine. For his  understanding of the Christian and the pagan  can be readily seen to 
have the general shape which would remain in all writings from the  reading of Augustine and 
Plotinus he undertook  in his thesis.  
There is a reason that Camus’ youthful thoughts on Augustine have not impacted on 
Augustine scholarship, and it is not because all Augustine scholars are believers – it is simply 
because it is not very deep. The thesis itself was given 28 out of 40, around a B. And that grade I 
think is a reasonable assessment of a work which shows great self-assurance  (leading one of the 
examiners to say, what has remained the consensus in Camus reception, that he was ‘more a 
writer than a philosopher,” ( Camus 2007: 6) but not a very convincing or detailed argument. 
According to Camus, Augustine’s philosophical conundrums about evil and the soul find their 
solution in Plotinus, which he then appropriates. What is most conspicuous in Camus’ depiction 
of Augustine is the absence of, if we may use a phrase of Camus’ from The Myth of Sisyphus, 
‘the prop of the flesh.’ Augustine is presented by Camus (and to be fair to him, he is not alone in 
this mistake) as if he is primarily seeking to convert university professors and candidates in 
philosophy.  If Camus’ interpretation of Augustine is thin there, it gets no thicker elsewhere.  
Camus’ thesis manages to do four things simultaneously, which, I think, tend to remain a 
constant throughout his life when it came to reflecting on Christianity and paganism. First he 
emphasizes that Christianity is a way of life; secondly he sees it in fundamentally Greek terms 
(the centre-piece of the thesis: Augustine’s borrowings from neo-Platonism to save the project); 
thirdly he contrasts it negatively with paganism; and fourthly he leaves a tear in the fabric of the 
argument which makes possible a dialogue with Christianity.  
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  Of these four aspects of his argument, his argument, already here as in his later writings, 
is strongest as a criticism of what I have called phantasmic Christianity, i.e. Christianity when it 
is pathological in its otherworldliness, and either indifferent, masochistic or destructive to the 
world. Camus’ argument is extremely weak as an historical appreciation of Christianity as  a 
process of continuing metamorphosis. The idea of metamorphosis is encapsulated in the 
understanding of the Holy Spirit, though it has different aspects and accentuations in the 
different phases and forms of Christianity. Thus it is most conspicuous in Johannine Christianity 
– which does not require commitment to any form or dwelling place of the Spirit-, very 
important to that Protestant wing of Christianity which emphasizes the invisibility of the real 
Church. Indeed both the Johannine and Protestant forms of Christianity are defined by their 
opposition to the ossification of form.  But it is also wrong to see the Catholic Church as rigidly 
committed to the forms of its faith. Its break with the Orthodox Church owed much to what it 
saw as an anti-historical, institutional spirit of the Eastern Church (See Rosenstock-Huessy 
1966).  
The history of the Christian faith is not only a history of schisms and sects, but of the 
spread of a faith through a great diversity, development and hybridity of forms of life – this is in 
keeping with its original mission of redeeming pagan forms of life by infusing them with the 
commandment of love (even if the story is also inseparable from the more typically human 
power grabs). The weakness of Camus’ position is exacerbated by the fact that his vision of 
Greek and pagan life is so manifestly idealized, more or less indifferent to the internecine 
warfare that tore the Greek city-states apart. Greeks did indeed speak of measure in various 
places—in tragedy and in philosophy and in law—and they spoke of it in much the same way 
and, it might well seem, for much the same reason that Foucault so rightly says about the way in 
which prison reform functions in the prison system: as  a means of ensuring that the system 
continues as is. The point of all the talk about measure was due to how unmeasured the Greeks 
were. Thucydides shows this so patently by the Melian and Metilene dialogues: one lot is 
murdered by the Athenians, the other is spared, but in both cases it is the same calculating logic 
that rules (Thucydides 1972: 194- 211, 400-408). Consequences are expediency. Likewise, 
Thucydides shows the havoc caused by imperial overreach in the failed expedition to Sicily of 
Alcibiades. Yes, the Greeks constantly showed examples of what happens to men who failed to 
live by measure, and, yet, perpetually it bred just those very men – thus Nietzsche (approvingly) 
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cites from the apocryphal Platonic dialogue Theages the idea that each man longs to be a tyrant 
(an idea, of course, which Plato hopes to knock down) (Nietzsche 1967: §958). And Plato takes 
on the entire Greek world by showing how Socrates is the only hope of young Greek men 
finding a better alternative than tyranny, only also showing that Athens’ demise comes from 
executing ‘the best and wisest who ever lived.’ Nietzsche argues, in Twilight of the Idols, that 
Socrates was the impure slave type who wanted to destroy what was best in Greece, and 
Platonism was but the infection of the noble by plebianism (Nietzsche 1990: 39ff). That 
Nietzsche equated Platonism and Christianity (Nietzsche 1990b: 31) and Judaism is as sorry a 
testament to his ignorance of the Jews as it is to his reading of the role of Christianity in Europe. 
But what I wish to emphasize is that Greece tore itself apart - and its paganism fuelled that 
tearing. Indeed, one major difference between Camus and Nietzsche’s readings of the pagan 
world is how utterly unidealistic Niezsche is  - even if he is enthralled and bedazzled by it, he 
does not underestimate the role of violence and death in its perpetuity – which is why he finds in 
the Greeks a commitment to eternal return. Camus loved Nietzsche’s genius, but little of his 
politics, and the dangerous delusions of his aristocratic distance. And whereas Nietzsche attacked 
Christianity precisely because of the various forms of solidarity it has engendered – its 
democracy, its socialism, its spawning of the women’s movement, its intermingling of the races 
— these are precisely the forms of resistance which Camus sides with, as is evident in a 
statement that anticipates the emancipatory politics of the post-structuralists, who have generally 
ignored the fact that they follow in his political tracks: 
 
The miner who is exploited or shot down, the slaves in the camps, those in the 
colonies, the legions of the persecuted,  throughout the world—they need all those 
who can speak to communicate their silence and to keep in touch with them… I 
cannot keep from being drawn towards everyday life, towards those, whoever 
they may be, who are humiliated and debased. They need to hope, and if all keep 
silent  or if they are given the choice between two kinds of humiliation, they will 
forever be deprived of  hope and we with them. (Camus 1975: 190-191) 
 
Camus’ opposition to totality and his defense of plurality and the relative is what is 
behind his valorization of the pagan gods, whose contiguity with men enables an appeal to 
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relativism against the wrath of a transcendent absolute. But Camus is silent on the hellish side of 
relativism, that side which is testified to by Hesiod, whose Theogony and Works and Days are 
but a desperate attempt to transform Zeus into an all-seeing and all-wise harbinger of justice to 
put a brake on pluralistic  creation gone savagely mad. Yes, the Greeks were pluralistic; and yes, 
there is a house of gods; but they are gods who fight and play and who are caught up with the 
fate of mortals, as Zeus, depicted by Homer, looks helplessly on at the human agony of a war 
played out by men who know not which forces they may transgress at any moment. Camus’ view 
of the pagan completely overlooks the reasons behind the monotheistic impulse that reaches 
from Hesiod to Plato and Aristotle. 
Thus too Camus’ pre-Plague positing of pagan innocence against Christian guilt does 
make sense when the sunny pure (he uses the term ‘pure’ so naively, and fails to see that the very 
metaphysical horror of the moderns is so encapsulated in that very term—a pure race, a pure 
communism etc.) cloudless sky is invoked against European fog (The Fall) and the oppressively 
rigid Parisian Catholic black view of life.  
As for the innocence of the Greeks, he easily ignores how the Greek is never certain 
against which god he will transgress; but the Greek pantheon was such that transgression was 
inevitable because the gods did not share the same loves or purposes, but were, to use a term of 
Bernard Knox’s, furiously self-absorbed (Knox1990: 44) —and this is why measure is for the 
Greeks so necessary and so useless. When Protagoras says man is the measure, he is continuing 
the Promethean and Sisyphean task of defying the gods—for, by making man the measure, he is 
wanting to de-divinise the universe.  
In this sense Camus is Greek, and Sisyphus is an apt choice for this process because he 
fails and is punished. Camus has an intimation of this failure, but his task is compounded by the 
horizon against and upon which his philosophical imagination is activated.  Camus is torn, as we 
moderns and postmoderns generally are, by the conflict between our servitude to the hidden 
purposes and powers, which the ancients called gods, and the ostensible freedom and sovereignty 
of the self. We know how unconvinced Camus was by Sartre’s depiction of the responsibility of 
freedom; its character and framing, even up to the very use of the term ‘bad faith,’ which carries 
with it an archaic guilt-ridden view of life suggestive of no religion more than Manicheanism – a 
pagan doctrine that all too often is mistakenly passed off as the Catholic view of life. Yet the 
world Camus inherits is the modern one in which, as Heidegger put it, the gods have fled, and 
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the self inhabits, as Pascal put it, a universe of infinite space and silence. Camus’s absurdist man 
makes all his choices in this silent universe. And like so many moderns, Camus, at least in 
Sisyphyus, much like those Enlightened philosophes who confuse the entirety of religion with its 
perverse 18th century French form, would have us believe that life was ever and always thus.  
Camus is deeply aware of the cursed condition of the modern, but his account of how it 
got thus and how he stands with respect to it is, to put it mildly, extremely questionable. In spite 
of his animosity toward Hegelianism, nothing is so Hegelian and, again I add, Greek 
(specifically Anaxagorian and  Aristotelian) as Camus’ reading of Christianity as if it were a 
seed which generated a specific fate that was forever en-seeded at the beginning. (Cf. Hegel’s 
conclusion of his Logic which connects himself with Aristotle). In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus 
gives no idea of Christianity as an incarnating force, and it is not that Camus stands against this 
aspect of the Christian tradition, it is more the case that he is simply unaware of it. 
 The Rebel with its affirmation of solidarity that does not simply negate itself through 
metaphysical reification is, as we have suggested, the answer to Sisyphus. It is a work which 
emphasizes relationship, while Sisyphus depicts a de-souled universe and solitary set of subjects 
confronted by their own absurdity. Read from the vantage point of The Rebel,  Sisyphus is a book 
of longing, longing  for the solidarity and love, the love itself which ends up becoming that very 
appeal whose possibility he originally denies. The Rebel’s concluding appeal to love of life has 
revealed the solution to the quest of the absurd man who having renounced all hope, for fear of 
committing philosophical suicide by hoping too early, can now learn to love and hope again in 
the solidarity and rebellious unity of those struggling for a modicum of justice. In The Rebel 
Camus has returned to the circle of community  (the Hegelian image is deliberate); and his 
community—actual poor, actual miners, actual trade unionists, actual French men/women and 
Algerian men/women etc.—who can live under a common sun is more real than the vicious 
metaphysical circle of murderers who in the name of revolt have divested themselves of 
themselves and become but the servants of abstractions which have ensconced the antithesis of 
justice in its name.  
 Two further things are all important and they are what are really responsible for the tear 
in the fabric being so easily mended by the Johannine (post-Christian) form of Christianity. One 
is that Camus really is Descartes’ child. At times he seems to nod to this. He is Descartes’ child 
in his vision of life as spatial rather than temporal, and in his absurd denial of his historicity in 
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order to have a new beginning. Yet his absurd types are obviously figures of history, none more 
contemporary and more empty than those absurd civil servants he mentions (Camus 1975: 85) 
who are the very antithesis of the conquerors and Don Juans and artists he portrays with such 
artistry. His admission of the source of Europe’s  despair reveals the truth of which he is the 
incarnation: that modern men and women are isolated and all too often unloved, and only by 
rebelling against this state of affairs can they find a way back to love. But that all men and 
women are in this position is what Europeans know is not the case, which is why they so readily 
romanticize indigenous and alien spiritual traditions where the gods have not fled, but walk 
amongst the living and the dead, and thus enchant everyday life in a manner which Europeans 
frequently crave, and which Camus seems to suggest can be found in the more benign elements 
of nature, if only those who live under the same (Mediterranean) sun can live and love in peace.  
 Camus, then, after such a tortured and agonizing search, has a sense of the power of life 
to serve and it is this same power which engenders community. To put it in an extra-modern 
sense, he has found the god to summon, to pray to: the god of love, justice, and charity. But 
surely this is the most familiar God of all to those whose heritage (let us leave belief out of this, 
and that I wish to do, because few words are used so mindlessly and uselessly as belief) is (post-) 
Christian. For, this is the Christian God who was originally the God of the Jews. Camus has 
reached that God—and more or less the position of John’s Epistle, that unless one love’s the 
neighbour one cannot love God. His reaching this God has not been through a mere act of 
acceptance/leap of faith regarding what his Catholic Church taught him as a child. That Church 
had been so ensconced in the Greek scholastic tradition, and that tradition was not brewed as 
Camus unconvincingly suggests, in Augustine, but in Paris—this same Paris whose university 
had become a stronghold of resistance against  Protestantism (inciting the St. Bartholomew’s 
massacre). It is with Paris, with Abelard and St. Thomas, that that infamous Greek dyad of 
transcendence and immanence dictates the meaning of the bible (and against just this sort of 
dictatorship that a Reformation took place).  
The young Camus had favourably quoted Porphyry, but he had overlooked how 
Christianity’s power lay in not appealing to such school masters as Porphyry, but to starving 
souls looking for just the kind of solidarity and rebellious unity that Camus was looking for—
except this unity was not needed against a silent universe, but one populated with gods who once 
having incited gladiatorial games, had now, in non-Roman guise, incited conquests and tribal 
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cycles of vengeance which people were fleeing from. Porphyry’s teacher, Plotinus, was, as far as 
one can tell, a very decent man indeed. And he had taken on board the importance of love in a 
manner which betrays a Christian debt rather than a Platonic one. Hence Margaret Miles points 
out that Plotinus’ care for women and orphans was remarkably similar to the duties expected of 
Christian bishops ( Miles 1999: 112).But ultimately what he taught was one exclusive way of 
life, viz. the way of the philosophical mystic. The Church, on the other hand, attracted members 
because of its largess with respect to types and offices required to remake the world that had 
been shattered by the pagan energies Camus makes so light of. Camus’s greatness is best when 
he speaks from suffering, but he confuses cause and effect when he plays off the pagan and 
Christian.  Of course, the Christian world breeds no end of monsters, but the paradox of the 
Christian world is that it is always in the midst of the pagan world, as Augustine’s heavenly city 
is always doing battle with the earthly city, which is to say, the Christian is not Christian because 
of a badge or declaration or vestment or symbol but because of one thing alone, viz. because of a 
commitment to following Christ in the renunciation of the powers of this world for the powers of 
everlasting life and love. Thus the Christian world is always ever but a small province under the 
dominion of ostensibly Christian institutions which can never completely wall themselves off 
from the  pagan energies which are common to all human beings. 
In conclusion, the real appeal of Camus was less to the pagan as such, but to the power of 
love, not in a  romantic sense, not in an idealized sense, but in the love of a diverse solidarity in 
which the powers of men and women are truly able to become what they are. This too was why 
he emphasized the importance of dialogue. 
 
 The mutual understanding and communication discovered by rebellion can only 
succeed in the free exchange of dialogue. Every ambiguity, every 
misunderstanding leads to death; clear language and simple words are the only 
salvation from it. The climax of every tragedy lies in the deafness of its heroes. 
Plato is right and not Moses and Nietzsche. Dialogue on the level of mankind is 
less costly than the gospel preached by totalitarian regimes in the form of a 
monologue dictated from the top of a lonely mountain.’ (Camus 1990: 247-248)  
 
19 
 
I could quibble here about whether Moses is as un-dialogical as Camus implies (Buber 
clearly did not think so) or if Plato is genuinely dialogical (Rosenzweig did not think so), but 
Camus had grasped that only in our responsiveness and in our willingness to hear the absolute 
need of one who must stand in his or her difference can genuine solidarity be attained. Otherwise 
it is just a suffocating mechanism of the spirit (modern liberal and managerial styles) or outright 
totalitarian murder.  
It is true that Camus was generally so overwhelmed by the present, and disgusted by 
those who gambled all on a different future, that he failed to do justice to the role of the future as 
a force with which we must deal and respond to. Secondly, his reaction equally blocks out a 
more nuanced and accurate and important understanding of how the past works. It does indeed 
bequeath terrible burdens and lead to terrible catastrophes, of ‘sins’ accruing over time and 
undealt with, but it also provides legacies and fruits so there can be greater forms of solidarity. 
This is far closer to what Augustine meant by providence, and it cannot be dismissed so swiftly 
as Camus, and not just Camus, suggests. Camus knows as well as anyone that he did not need, 
for example, to argue with modern men and women interested in creating greater forms of 
solidarity that the institution of slavery needs to be abolished or adults given the franchise. That 
work had been achieved by past generations, and he was heir to that labour and suffering.  
If I have taken issue throughout with Camus’ understanding of the Christian, I have, 
nevertheless, been arguing that Camus’ own appeals are of a type that is thoroughly consistent 
with what we may follow Rosenstock-Huessy in calling a particular kind of incognito 
Christianity (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966: 126-127). I go further and suggest that Camus’ 
incognito Christianity is advanced under his advocacy of paganism.  In a world forced to come to 
grips with the bloody horror of much that has been done under the auspices of Christianity, this 
appeal to the pagan is understandable. I have suggested, however, that such an appeal to the 
pagan is based upon a two-fold failure –a failure to be sufficiently open about the horrors 
intrinsic to paganism, which are those intrinsic to humanity as such, and a failure to grasp the 
significance of Augustine’s distinction between the City of God and the City of Man, the former 
being not simply equivocal to the historical Church, but rather to that aspect of the Church that is 
genuinely working in obedience to God’s commandments of love. Amongst Camus numerous 
references to love, the following  all illustrate how central love was to Camus’ social vision: 
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‘Recognize the need for enemies. Love that they exist. Recover the greatest strength, not 
to dominate but to give. (Camus 2008: 204)  
‘Whoever gives nothing has nothing. The great misfortune is not to be unloved, but not to 
love’  (Camus 2008: 39).  
‘What takes longest in the world is learning to love’ (Camus 2008: 83). 
‘Nobody deserves to be loved—nobody measures up to that immeasurable gift. Those 
who receive love then discover injustice’ (Camus 2008: 102).  
 
But perhaps the key to Camus’ own incognito faith can be detected in his reflection on a 
the Doukhobors, a Russian sect, often persecuted, who adopted a purely ‘Spiritual Christianity,’ 
and thus broke with traditional Christian symbolism:  
  
The Doukhobors, Christianity is within. It dies and resurrects in us. Every Christian has 
two names – one corporal, the other spiritual – which God gives to him at the spiritual 
birth, according to his actions. The latter name is not known to anyone below; it will be 
known in eternity. (Camus 2008: 51)  
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